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A RAND NOTE

**Changes in the Soviet Military Leadership
Since 1987**

Sergei Zamascikov

December 1990

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Sergel Zamascikov

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**Prepared for the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

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PREFACE

The RAND Corporation is providing analytical assistance to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on the subject of recent developments in Soviet military affairs. This two-year effort seeks to identify and explain the major elements of continuity and change in Soviet military organization, concepts, and goals since the rise of President Gorbachev and his "new political thinking." It looks beyond the rhetoric of *glasnost* and *perestroika* to the underlying motivations that account for the many departures that have occurred in such areas as Soviet declaratory rhetoric, operational doctrine, national security decisionmaking, and defense resource allocation.

This Note assesses the personnel changes in the Soviet High Command since the dismissal of former Minister of Defense Marshal Sergei Sokolov in May 1987. It also offers three case studies of the most typical Gorbachev appointees.

The research reported here was conducted in the International Security and Defense Policy program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should be of interest to members of the U.S. defense community concerned with evolving Soviet military policy, civil-military relations, defense policy formulation, and arms control behavior.

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SUMMARY

The staggering domestic economic and political crisis facing Gorbachev has prompted a major national security reassessment and a significant change in the Soviet Union's international and arms control policy. As a result, the Soviet military is beginning to face its most severe manpower and budgetary constraints since the end of World War II. It is also trying to accommodate itself to a new "defensive doctrine," which appears to call for a very different operational orientation on its part. For Gorbachev to succeed in curing many of the Soviet Union's domestic ills, he must reduce the West's perception of the Soviet military threat. This will permit an opening of the country to greater trade and technological assistance from the West, a disengagement from the military competition, and a reduction in the military's drain on critical assets by significantly diminishing its size. The cooperation of the military leadership is critical for all of this.

Since 1984, dramatic changes have taken place in Soviet military personnel policy. The process of rejuvenation that began in 1984 has been sharply accelerated by Gorbachev. This process is likely to continue in the years ahead. At the same time, the past three years have witnessed a significant erosion in the military's political and social status and, even more, a decline in its role in the national security policy process. This is reflected in a number of developments that have had either a deliberate or an unintended negative impact on the military.

One such development was the humiliating defeat of senior commanders in the 1989 Supreme Soviet elections. As a result, symbolic representation in the legislature, once guaranteed to top military officials, will probably decrease. In future elections, the military is unlikely to secure as many seats as it has won in the recent past. Moreover, more slots will probably go to lower ranks than to general officers.

Personnel changes at the top of the Soviet military hierarchy have been radical in their numbers. Since May 1987, the minister of defense and three of his first deputies have been replaced. Indeed, in his four years as General Secretary, Gorbachev has replaced 15 members of the 17-member Ministry of Defense Collegium, which represents the top Soviet military leadership. The new appointees are invariably younger and, for the most part, politically and philosophically more akin to Gorbachev.

In contrast, changes at the regional level have been more conventional. Most appointments and transfers in this category have been caused by the normal "ripple effect," with deputies taking over their superiors' jobs or deserving commanders receiving due promotions.

Overall, some key aspects of Gorbachev's military personnel strategy are discernible:

- Appointing outsiders to the most important leadership positions. The most dramatic example of this was the advancement of a virtually unknown commander of the Far Eastern Military District to the position of chief of the General Staff.
- A growing politicization of military personnel and a preference for politically active officers who publicly align themselves with *perestroika*.
- The emergence of two powerful groups within the military-- the Far Easterners (those who served in the Far Eastern Military District in the late 1970s and early 1980s) and the *Afghantsy* (veterans of the Afghan war).
- A relative conservatism on the part of lower-level appointees.

A close examination of some key appointments since 1987 sheds light both on Gorbachev's military personnel preferences and on some of his views concerning the military. The case studies of top officer appointments presented here suggest three distinct trends in personnel policy. The appointment of Army General Mikhail Moiseev to chief of the General Staff was a surprising move that indicated a relative decline in

the General Staff's authority. The appointment of Army General Peter Lushev as commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces was an astute political compromise--Gorbachev's way of appeasing conservative leaders of the East European Warsaw Pact countries--and implied that the role and importance of the WTO will probably diminish. Finally, Gorbachev's appointment of Army General Nikolai Popov as commander of the Troops of Southern Direction was a logical selection of the most distinguished candidate to take charge of the potentially most explosive areas--Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, and the Indian peninsula, not to mention the domestic tinder box of the Central Asian republics and Transcaucasian area. A common feature linking these individuals, as different as they are in other respects, is that all three are highly politicized officers who pay close attention to the political side of personnel training.

Analysis of Gorbachev's tenure at the helm of the Defense Council thus far leads to several concluding observations:

- The political leadership--and Gorbachev in particular--is dissatisfied with the slow pace of *perestroika* in the military and feels that more radical reforms are necessary.
- The leadership believes that these radical reforms demand a younger, more flexible military leadership and one that will not be crippled by interservice rivalries or constrained by traditional institutional logic.
- Gorbachev has a clear policy of appointing outsiders to key positions in which a considerable improvement in performance is expected.
- The civilian leadership is strengthening its control over the military and its role in the national security policy process.
- Although the military has seemed willing to fall in line thus far with Gorbachev's "radicalism," the combination of his cavalier treatment of traditionally protected military bailiwicks and the country's continuously disappointing economic performance may soon place the High Command in the ranks of Gorbachev's domestic political opposition.

GLOSSARY

AF	Air Force
ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
CC	Central Committee
CGoF	Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia)
COS	Chief of Staff
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DOSAAF	Voluntary Society for the Assistance to Aviation, the Army, and the Navy
FDC	First Deputy Chief
FE	Far East
GRU	Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
GS	General Staff
GSF	Group of Soviet Forces
MD	Military District
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MPA	Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and the Navy
PA	Political Administration
PD	Political Department
PL	Poland
SRF	Strategic Rocket Forces
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
SU	Soviet Union
VPVO	Soviet Air Defense Troops
WP	Warsaw Pact

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I. GORBACHEV AND THE HIGH COMMAND

The four years since Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of leadership have witnessed a dramatic transformation in senior Soviet military personnel selection policy. This transformation began in 1984, when an unusual combination of transfers, reorganizations, retirements and deaths led to more than 45 personnel changes in the Soviet military hierarchy by February 1987. (This number does not include changes at the TVD headquarters level, which the Soviet press does not report.) By the end of 1987, Gorbachev had presided over some 23 changes in the Soviet regional command at the level of military district commander and above.¹ Overall, during the four years of Gorbachev's tenure, 46 new appointments have occurred at the top level of the Soviet regional command. This number represents a significant departure from the Brezhnev era (see Table 1).

This Note assesses the personnel changes in the Soviet High Command that have taken place since the dismissal of former Minister of Defense Marshal Sergei Sokolov in May 1987.² It also offers case studies of the three most typical Gorbachev appointees.

Table 1

NEW APPOINTMENTS IN THE SOVIET REGIONAL COMMANDS, 1972-1989

Year	Number of New Appointments
1972-1973	10
1975-1976	10
1977-1978	9
1979-1980	11
1981-1982	10
1983-1984	12
1985-1986	15
1987-1988	20
1989	12

¹The Soviet armed forces are organized into 14 territorial military districts, four groups of forces abroad, and four fleets. There are also four peacetime theater-level commands.

²For changes during the first two years of Gorbachev's rule, see

Gorbachev's most recent years as General Secretary have not been happy ones for the military. Among the unpleasant setbacks it has endured since 1987 are a lost seat on the Politburo following an undignified firing of the minister of defense; a cap on the number of promotions;³ the announced unilateral reduction of Soviet forces and significant defense budget cuts; continuous attacks on the military profession by both the central and local media; and the humiliating defeat of senior commanders in the Supreme Soviet elections (see App. C). Even more important, major changes in the national security policy process have effectively challenged and, in some cases, reduced the military's role.⁴ Adding insult to injury are the domestic policing functions that Soviet troops have been forced to carry out for more than two years in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and, more recently, in Georgia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Lithuania. The military is extremely displeased with this new internal security role foisted upon it by the political leadership.⁵

All these developments point to a sharp decline in the military's social and political standing. One unmistakable indication of this has been the rapid retirement of the World War II generation of military leaders, war heroes who have traditionally enjoyed great popularity and, as such, carried significant political weight. In 1985, all 16 members of the Ministry of Defense Collegium were World War II veterans. Of these, only six remain today.⁶

Sergei Zamasikov, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 7, 1988, pp. 227-251.

³See the promotion list in App. B.

⁴Michael Dobbs, "Officers Tried to Prevent Army's Move Into Baku," *Washington Post*, January 26, 1990; S. Plotnikov, "Ofitser otvetil: net," *Komsomolskaya pravda*, February 14, 1990; "Nas postoianno ekzameniuet zhizn," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, February 20, 1990; Major General G. Kashuba, "Za otkryti, chestnyi dialog," *Rabochaya tribuna*, February 2, 1990; Sergei Zamascikov, "The Red Army Fights for Its Life," *Wall Street Journal*, April 16, 1990.

⁵See, for example, Maj. O. Vladykin, "Instigators," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, December 14, 1988.

⁶Part of the reason for this may be that Gorbachev has simply felt uncomfortable in the presence of bemedaled generals and marshals, since he himself never served in the military. The public ridicule heaped on Leonid Brezhnev's self-indulgent vanity and love for military honors has clearly reflected Gorbachev's distaste for such extravagant displays.

Several trends are now discernible in Gorbachev's military personnel policy. Among the most important are:

- Appointing outsiders to the most important military posts.
- A growing politicization of the senior military leadership (i.e., a preference for "politically active" officers).
- The emergence of two powerful groups within the military, the "Far Easterners" and the "Afghans."
- The relative conservatism of lower-level appointees, reflecting the Zaikov/Yazov style.

PERSONNEL CHANGES

A dramatic upheaval at the top of the Soviet military leadership occurred in May 1987 following the Rust affair, when the minister of defense and three of his deputies were replaced. Since then, Gorbachev has made another six changes in the Ministry of Defense Collegium, which represents the top military leadership and includes the minister of defense and his 16 deputies. This is in addition to the seven changes made during his first two years in office. Overall, he has appointed 15 new members to the 17-member Collegium (see Table 2).⁷ The 1987-1989 appointees are considerably younger than their predecessors and lack their World War II experience. Their average age (57) represents Gorbachev's generation. The average age of the 1985-1986 appointees was 63.

The most surprising Gorbachev appointment was that of the virtually unknown military commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Colonel General M. A. Moiseev, to the post of Chief of the General Staff. This appointment, which followed the elevation of Moiseev's former boss, Army General Yazov, to minister of defense, signalled a continuation of Gorbachev's tendency to select outsiders for the most important

⁷The Collegium, one form of "collective leadership" in the Soviet military establishment, represents an instrument of control over the military by the party. Although the minister of defense still enjoys the rights of a commander (*edinonachal'nik*), each Collegium member must report any dissenting opinion to the Politburo.

Table 2

MEMBERS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE COLLEGIUM

	Appointed	Born
D. T. Yazov (Minister of Defense)	5/87	1923
M. A. Moiseev (Chief of the General Staff)	12/88	1939
P. G. Lushev (Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact)	02/89	1923
K. A. Kochetov (First Deputy of the Minister of Defense)	02/89	1932
N. I. Zhliaga (Chief MPA)	07/90	1935
Yu. P. Maksimov (CinC SRF)	07/85	1924
V. I. Varennikov (CinC Ground Forces)	02/89	1923
I. M. Tretiak (CinC VPVO)	06/87	1923
A. N. Yefimov (CinC Air Forces)	12/84	1923
V. N. Chernavin (CinC Navy)	12/85	1928
V. M. Arkhipov (Chief Rear Services)	05/88	1933
A. I. Sorokin (Chief Inspector)	07/87	1922
N. V. Chekov (Chief of Construction)	11/88	1931
V. L. Govorov (Chief Civil Defense)	07/86	1924
V. M. Shabanov (Deputy MoD: Armaments)	06/78	1923
V. F. Ermakov (Deputy MoD: Personnel)	07/90	1935
Yu. A. Yashin (Deputy MoD: Destruction of the intermediate-range ballistic missiles)	04/89	1930

NOTE: Current membership as of May 9, 1989.

positions. The appointment of Moiseev and certain other top military leaders also dramatized a trend toward further politicization of senior military personnel, or Gorbachev's preference for "politically active" officers.⁸

Gorbachev has also exhibited some sensitivity to the political dimension of his military personnel policy. This was evidenced by the appointment of Army General Peter Lushev as commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces. Lushev, 66, a close associate and protege of his

⁸For more on this politicization, see Zamascikov, "Gorbachev and the New Military," p. 241. Articles written by the new military leaders indicate that they pay far greater attention than did their predecessors to such issues as the nationality problem, the anticorruption campaign, and political work in military units. Gorbachev seems to prefer officers who openly align themselves with *perestroika*.

predecessor Marshal Kulikov (and only two years younger), reassured the conservative East European political leaders that there would be continuity in the Soviet military commitment to the alliance. This was particularly important in light of Gorbachev's unilateral troop cuts in Europe.

Lushev's case aside, there are good grounds for assuming that the rejuvenation process in the High Command will continue and that several veteran Collegium members will retire in the next two years. These members will include two appointed prior to Gorbachev, Army General Shabanov (deputy minister of defense for armaments) and Marshal of Aviation Efimov (commander in chief of the Air Force). Among other candidates for retirement are World War II veteran Army Generals Maksimov (SRF), Tretiak (VPVO), and Govorov (Civil Defense). They will be followed by Army General Sukhorukov (Cadres). Army General Sorokin, chief of the Main Inspectorate, will probably remain to supervise the large group of his retired colleagues. The leaders who will replace these individuals will probably come from the Far Eastern or Afghan factions in the Soviet High Command. These two groups, the generals who served in the Far East and the top officer veterans of the Afghan war, have lately become very prominent in the Soviet military establishment.

THE FAR EASTERNERS

An important dimension of Gorbachev's military personnel policy has been the appearance at the topmost leadership levels of a large group of "Far Easterners," generals who served in the Soviet Far Eastern Military District in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In 1978, the peacetime headquarters of the Soviet Forces High Command in the Far East was reinstated. It now controls the Far Eastern, Transbaikalian, and Siberian Military Districts, as well as Soviet forces in Mongolia and the Pacific Fleet. A close look at the list of top Soviet commanders reveals a disproportionate representation of those who have served in the Far East during the past ten years.

Table 3

FAR EASTERNERS IN THE SOVIET MILITARY LEADERSHIP

D. T. Yazov	Minister of Defense
M. A. Moiseev	Chief of the General Staff
P. G. Lushev	CinC Warsaw Pact
I. M. Tretiak	CinC VPVO Troops
V. L. Govorov	Chief Civil Defense
M. I. Sorokin	Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief of the Main Inspectorate
V. N. Lobov	FDC for Warsaw Pact; WP Chief of Staff
V. A. Vostrov	Chief Main Military Educational Insts. Directorate
A. V. Kovtunov	CinC of the Far East Troops (Ulan-Ude)
N. I. Popov	CinC of the Southern Direction Troops (Baku)
S. I. Postnikov	CinC Western Direction Troops (Legnica, PL)
M. P. Burlakov	Commander of the Southern GSF (Papa, HU)
N. V. Kalinin	Commander Moscow MD (Moscow)
F. M. Kuzmin	Commander Baltic MD (Riga)
I. S. Morozov	Commander Odessa MD (Odessa)
V. A. Patrikeev	Commander Transcaucasian MD (Tbilisi)
B. V. Snetkov	CinC Western GSF (Wunsdorf, GDR)
G. I. Salmanov	Commander of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy
N. F. Kiziun	Commander of V.I. Lenin Military Political Academy
V. A. Silakov	Chief, VPVO Political Administration
A. I. Shirinkin	Chief of the Party Commission of the MPA
V. I. Pan'kin	Chief of the Main Staff of the Soviet Air Forces
N. N. Kotlovtshev	Chief of the DOSAAF
V. M. Mikhailov	Deputy Chief of the GS (Chief of the GRU)

What attracted Gorbachev to this group? One answer seems obvious: these people were stationed as far away from Moscow as possible and hence were not part of the Ministry of Defense "mafia" whose members largely owed their positions to Brezhnev's corrupt reign. It is logical to assume that Gorbachev has sought to install officers in the highest postings who hold greater allegiance to him than to the military for their positions. Other clues are to be found in the press articles about the Far Eastern Military District that appeared after Gorbachev's visit there.

An article in *Krasnaia Zvezda* commented that the visiting Gorbachev "gave some advice and recommendations pertaining to the decisive restructuring of work style and radical improvement in military

discipline, organization, and order."⁹ At the time, the commanders of the Far Eastern Military District could well benefit from such advice, since for many years they had been criticized for poor discipline. Although this discipline problem was likely reported to Gorbachev, he probably also appreciated District Commander Yazov's honest assessment of the situation: the article relates that Gorbachev "asked the commander about the matter of discipline. The commander confessed that discipline in the district had not improved recently and had even worsened in individual units and subunits. He presented accurate figures. Hundreds of officers and dozens of generals attended this talk. Now, in the district this talk is called none other than a lesson in truth."¹⁰

According to newspaper reports published after Gorbachev's visit, the district's situation began to improve thanks to the successful strategy adopted by Yazov and his headquarters staff, "whereby a thorough critique of the reasons for the District's discipline problem and a talk on ways to improve matters occurred."¹¹ Among those responsible for the dramatic improvement in discipline and work style was said to be District Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Moiseev. The combination of their remote posting and their apparent zeal for *perestroika* seems to have brought Yazov, Moiseev, and other Far Easterners to Moscow.

Although the Far Easterners are now a distinct and powerful group within the military leadership, they represent a specific and rather informal association. Not tied to a specific service branch such as the traditionally powerful group of "tankmen," they have no vested interest in advancing the goals of any larger category of servicemen or of any particular service arm. Rather, uniting them is a network of professional friendships and connections developed during service in the most remote and harsh part of the country. They are probably also

⁹Colonel V. Filatov, "Siloi pravdy," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, January 16, 1987.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

united by their disdain for those who made their careers through personal allegiance to the corrupt inner circle of Brezhnevites. Because its association is circumstantial, this group of Far Easterners in the High Command will probably not expand beyond its current numbers. It may even disappear once its most important members retire.

AFGHANTSY

Another large group within the top Soviet military leadership is composed of senior Afghan war veterans. Table 4 lists some of the key appointments from among these individuals. As a group, they may equal the Far Easterners in influence.

A tendency to promote the so-called *Afghantsy* began during the initial stages of the war. An early recipient was Army General Aleksandr Maiorov, one of the first senior commanders in Afghanistan, who was subsequently appointed first deputy commander of the ground forces. After Maiorov, a number of other senior *Afghantsy* were promoted. The most notable was the appointment of Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Sokolov, who had commanded the Soviet effort in Afghanistan, to the position of minister of defense in 1984.

Although one would expect rapid promotion for officers with combat experience, the situation is different for upper-echelon officers who did not directly take part in combat. The Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan can hardly be called a success. Yet almost every commander there received a prestigious promotion. Indeed, despite Moscow's having had to replace six commanders of the 40th Army in Afghanistan during the first six years of the war,¹² all of those commanders were subsequently promoted. The seventh and last commander of this army, General Boris V. Gromov, has been made a national hero. He has received the highest decorations and earned an unprecedented direct promotion from his field army command in Afghanistan to command the pivotal Kiev Military District, attaining in the process the rank of three-star general at age 45.¹³

¹²See the interview with General B. V. Gromov on *Vzгляд*, Moscow television service, March 3, 1989.

¹³It bears noting that Gromov was the man who became known in

Table 4

AFGHAN WAR VETERANS AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY LEADERSHIP

S. F. Akhromeev	Adviser to the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet
P. G. Lushev	CinC of the Warsaw Pact Forces
Yu. P. Maksimov	CinC of the SRF
V. I. Varennikov	CinC Ground Forces
V. M. Arkhipov	Deputy Minister of Defense--Chief of the Rear Services
M. I. Sorokin	Chief Inspector, Deputy MoD
V. F. Ermakov	Deputy MoD: Personnel
V. A. Vostrov	Chief Main Military Educational Insts. Directorate
V. M. Mikhailov	Deputy Chief of the General Staff (Chief of the GRU)
G. F. Krivosheev	Deputy Chief of the General Staff
V. G. Denisov	Deputy Chief of the General Staff
M. A. Gareev	Deputy Chief of the General Staff
B. V. Gromov	Commander Kiev MD (Kiev)
I. V. Fuzhenko	Commander Turkestan MD (Tashkent)
B. E. Pyankov	Commander Siberian MD (Novosibirsk)
I. N. Rodionov	Commander Transcaucasus MD (Tbilisi)
G. I. Salmanov	Commander of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy
L. E. Generalov	Commander of the "Vystrel" Officers Training Academy
V. P. Dubynin	Commander of Northern GoF (Legnica)
F. M. Kuzmin	Commander of Baltic MD (Riga)

Similar favors have been bestowed upon all other regional commanders who were involved in the planning and execution of the invasion. Army Generals V. M. Arkhipov, P. G. Lushev, and Yu. P. Maksimov later became deputy ministers of defense, and Colonel Generals G. F. Krivosheev and V. M. Mikhailov were promoted to become deputy chiefs of the General Staff. Also promoted and decorated were the heads of the Soviet military advisory groups and senior representatives of the High Command in Kabul: V. I. Varennikov, M. I. Sorokin, V. A. Vostrov, and G. I. Salmanov, as well as the commanders of the 40th Army, B. V. Gromov, V. F. Ermakov, B. E. Pyankov, I. N. Rodionov, L. E. Generalov, and Yu. V. Tukharinov.¹⁴

Afghanistan as the "Butcher of Salang." For a detailed, although at points overly flattering, biographical sketch of Gromov, see Richard Woff, "Lieutenant General Boris Gromov--The Making of the Soviet Commander," *Soviet Intelligence Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1989, pp. 188-192.

¹⁴*Krasnaia Zvezda* has published an extremely complimentary portrait

Evidence has increasingly come to light suggesting that the military was initially opposed to the invasion of Afghanistan.¹⁵ It is likely, therefore, that the political leadership cut a deal with the military to appease its concern in this regard. That deal probably involved granting the military immunity against blame for the war's failure. Although the initial bargain was probably made by Brezhnev, his successors, including Gorbachev, appear to have honored it. In a word, the military was granted the right to come out clean--and even with honor--from this distasteful war.

This large group of *Afghantsy*--more than 200,000 officers and NCOs strong--will probably continue to play an important role in the Soviet military establishment. One reason is that they have the only recent Soviet combat experience.¹⁶ In some service branches, such as the airborne and air-assault troops and the Air Force, their influence will even predominate.

Although the Soviet military press has generally praised the "heroism" and valuable combat experience of the Afghan war veterans, a note of resentment is discernible as well. *Afghantsy* have already earned the reputation of being "difficult," unwilling to compromise, and often inclined toward getting into trouble with their superiors. Their frequent refusal to follow existing rules and training manuals, which they consider outdated and inadequate, has caused the *Afghantsy* to

of the recent head of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan, Colonel General M. M. Sotskov. See "Sukhovy v Afganistane," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, June 1, 1989.

¹⁵See Varennikov's interview in *Ogonyok*, No. 12, 1989. It is interesting that the liberal weekly *Ogonyok* was compelled to run an unprecedented disclaimer after publishing a rather revealing interview with General Varennikov. The disclaimer stated that the thoughts and opinions contained in the interview represent the author's "personal views." See *Ogonyok*, No. 28, 1989. See also Army General Ivan G. Pavlovskii's interview in *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, No. 38, 1989, and General Gromov's interview "Pravda vyshe sensatsii," *Sovetskaya Rossiia*, November 15, 1989.

¹⁶In the Turkestan Military District Headquarters, for example, more than half of the officers and generals served in Afghanistan. See the interview with Colonel General I. Fuzhenko, *Krasnaia Zvezda*, September 12, 1989.

alienate many fellow officers. These officers resent both the *Afghantsy* demands for special treatment and the perks and privileges they receive. Such conflicts between those who "were" and "were not" in war, of course, have precedents elsewhere in recent military history. The impact of the Afghan war and the allegiances it forged among its participants, many of whom will be a part of the Soviet High Command for the next 20 years, will obviously be significant and worth watching.

REGIONAL COMMANDS

During 1987 and 1988, Gorbachev also presided over some 20 new appointments in the Soviet regional command (TVDs, military districts, groups of forces, and fleets). The year 1989 brought another 12 changes in regional command personnel (see Table 1). This constitutes a truly unprecedented turnover.

Unlike the dramatic shifts in the Ministry of Defense Collegium, however, changes at the regional level have been more routine. Most of the appointments and transfers in this category have been caused by the normal "ripple effect," in which a deputy assumes the job of a promoted superior or a distinguished commander receives the next higher post. If *perestroika* is causing a rapid turnover at the local level, this pattern of change is far from revolutionary. There are two possible reasons for this pattern. First, Gorbachev may not be directly involved in personnel changes at the regional level. Second, those responsible for personnel policies, both within the military and on the Central Committee, tend to be conservative and are not at all enthusiastic about the purge tactics characteristic of Gorbachev's reshuffling of the party apparatus.¹⁷

¹⁷Before the September 1989 Central Committee plenum, personnel changes were supervised by Politburo member Lev Zaikov. The former chief of the KGB and Central Committee secretary Viktor Chebrikov also oversaw military appointments through his State and Legal Affairs Department. Within the Ministry of Defense, personnel matters are overseen by Yazov himself, as well as by the deputy minister of defense in charge of personnel, Army General Dmitry Sukhorukov.

II. THE MILITARY AND THE SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS

Military representation did not suffer in terms of percentage of total membership during the March 26, 1989 elections to the Supreme Soviet.¹ The total number of military deputies elected was 85, including the border guard troops. This was a fair number out of the 2,250 total seats, considering that the military held only 55 positions in the 1,500-strong Supreme Soviet elected in 1984. However, the High Command suffered a notable blow to its prestige in these elections, since some top-ranking military leaders who ran were defeated either by civilians or by lower-ranking officers.

Major losers (those who either were not elected or whose positions no longer carry Supreme Soviet membership) included:

- Army General Arkhipov (Deputy Minister of Defense, Rear Services)
- Army General Snetkov (Commander of Western GSF, Germany)
- First Deputy Commander Strategic Rocket Forces
- First Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces
- First Deputy Commander Air Force
- First Deputy Commander Navy
- Chief of the Main Naval Staff
- Chief of the Political Directorate Strategic Rocket Forces
- Chief of Political Directorate Ground Forces
- Commander of the Southern Group of Forces
- Commander of the Far Eastern Military District
- Commander of Leningrad Military District
- Commander of Volga Military District
- Commander of Northern Fleet
- Commander of Black Sea Fleet
- Commander of Pacific Fleet
- Commander of Moscow Air Defense District

¹Some additional and runoff elections were held on April 9 and May 14, 1989.

Clearly the military leaders were disconcerted by these results. Indeed, some tried to blame their defeat on excessive *glasnost* and thus indirectly on Gorbachev. Such a viewpoint was well summarized in a speech by the chief of the political directorate of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General Yuri M. Pavlov. Addressing the plenum of the oblast and city party committees devoted to the analysis of election results, he complained that "a certain part of the population has developed negative attitudes toward the military. This is because of some publications in which many societal problems are attributed to excessive military expenditures, publications claiming that military service is not necessary or prestigious, that we should have a voluntary army, and so on."²

The election results thus point toward a major shift in the military's representation in the Supreme Soviet. Although only future elections can provide a clear answer, the symbolic representation previously guaranteed to the top military brass is likely to diminish substantially. Even members of the Ministry of Defense Collegium can no longer automatically assume that they will enjoy the status of Deputy of the Supreme Soviet. At present, the legislature contains three marshals of the Soviet Union, three marshals of aviation, forty-five generals and admirals, thirty-two officers, one sergeant, and two civilian employees of the military establishment. In future elections, the military may not acquire a comparable number of seats. Moreover, a great number of contested seats could be won by the lower ranks rather than by general officers.

²*Leningradskaya Pravda*, April 8, 1989.

III. THREE CASE STUDIES

To better understand Gorbachev's policies toward the military, it is helpful to take a closer look at some 1987-1989 appointments in the form of three short case studies: (1) the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Mikhail Moiseev; (2) the Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces, Army General Lushev; and (3) the Commander in Chief of the Troops of Southern Direction, Army General Nikolai Popov. Each of these appointments represents a distinct feature of Gorbachev's personnel policies toward the military: Moiseev's was an unprecedented move, Lushev's was a wise political compromise, and Popov's was a logical selection of the most distinguished candidate. Yet despite these distinguishing features, all three appointments share one important characteristic: each leader is highly politicized and pays special attention to the political aspect of troop training.

M. A. MOISEEV, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

In an unprecedented move, a virtually unknown commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Colonel General Mikhail A. Moiseev, was appointed on December 2, 1988, to replace Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeev as Chief of the Soviet General Staff.¹ Before this appointment, most foreign observers would not even have put Moiseev's name on a short list of serious contenders for Akhromeev's job. Yet his appointment confirmed the emergent strength of the Far Eastern faction in the Soviet command, a faction that includes Minister of Defense Yazov, his four deputies, and a number of other senior military officials. It also put an end to rumors about General Yazov's impending retirement.

When Mikhail Gorbachev met with the military leaders of this remote district in Khabarovsk on July 30, 1986, during a trip to the Far East, no one could predict that in less than three years some of these little-known men would be at the very top of the military hierarchy. Among

¹See *Sobranie Postanovlenii Pravitel'stva SSSR*, No. 1, 1989, p. 12.

those present at this meeting were the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Army General Dmitri Yazov, and his deputy, Lieutenant General Moiseev. Yazov found himself transferred to Moscow within six months of that fateful meeting, first as deputy minister of defense for personnel and then, in June 1987, as minister of defense, replacing Marshal Sergei Sokolov at the helm of the Soviet military machine following the Rust incident.²

Moiseev's Background

Army General Mikhail Alekseevich Moiseev was born in 1939 into a working-class family. He represents the generation of Soviet officers who were too young to have fought in World War II and whose careers have been formed in the age of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. His career has followed a path typical of the successful postwar-era officer. After graduation from the combined arms officers' school in 1962, Moiseev commanded a platoon and then a company, and then served as a battalion chief of staff and commander. Upon graduating from the Frunze Combined Arms Academy in 1972, he received a regimental command in the Belorussia Military District. Later he became chief of staff of a motorized rifle division. During that time, Moiseev was noticed as a promising young commander by General Ivan Tretiak, who at the time was the district commander. This connection was to play an important role in Moiseev's future career.

In the late 1970s, Moiseev commanded a motorized rifle division in the GSFG. He spent 1980 through 1982 at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy. Upon completion of his studies, he received a divisional and then a deputy army command in the Far Eastern Military District. General Tretiak, by then the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, continued to play a pivotal role in the career of his young

²Some other participants in this meeting were later promoted as well. For example, the chief of the Far East Troops Political Directorate, Colonel General Nikolai Kiziun, is now head of the V. I. Lenin Military-Political Academy. The chief of the Far Eastern Military District's Political Directorate, Lieutenant General Viktor Silakov, has now joined General Tretiak as head of the VPVO Political Directorate.

protege. In 1985, Moiseev was promoted to combined arms army commander in the same district. During that time he became closely associated with another key figure in the evolving Soviet military establishment, General Yazov. Yazov, who replaced Tretiak as commander of the Far Eastern Military District, was directly responsible for promoting the young general to the important post of army commander.

In late 1986, Moiseev was appointed chief of staff of the Far Eastern Military District, in the process becoming first deputy to Yazov. On July 30, 1986, Moiseev met Gorbachev, who on his momentous trip to the Far East had made a special stop in Khabarovsk to meet with the regional military leadership.³ It was then that the party leader evidently became impressed by Yazov's and Moiseev's dynamic, unconventional style--much akin to Gorbachev's own. This kinship was reflected in Yazov's and Moiseev's writings and earned them praise in several articles published by the military press.

After Yazov's promotion in January 1987 to deputy minister of defense, Moiseev replaced him as the Far Eastern Military District commander. From then on--and particularly after his former boss became minister of defense--the youngest commander of the largest Soviet military district was routinely referred to as a "rising star." But even after his promotion to the rank of colonel general in October 1987, Moiseev still seemed an unlikely candidate for the number-two military slot--at least for the immediate future.

What might have attracted Gorbachev's special attention to Moiseev? One explanation may be found in certain articles that appeared in the Soviet military press after Gorbachev's Far Eastern visit and Yazov's subsequent promotion. Indeed, it is possible that the very appearance of these articles may have contributed to Gorbachev's notice. *Krasnaia Zvezda* correspondent V. Filatov, for example, described Moiseev as a fierce opponent of the red-tape bureaucratic work style, quoting him as saying "I am personally one for seeing that a very minimum number of officers stay at desk jobs shuffling papers and ensuring control of the

³See *Krasnaia Zvezda*, July 31, 1986.

troops. I want to see the rest of them go to the companies, battalions, and regiments and work there.... With such a work style, no one will drown in excess paper.... We try to implement this work style at all levels."⁴

This work style proved successful after Moiseev became the Far East Military District commander. He apparently continued to be a strict disciplinarian and a staunch opponent of staff bureaucrats--qualities that Gorbachev liked in Moiseev's predecessor, Yazov. Significantly, the only two articles Moiseev published while he was district commander dealt with the subject of strengthening discipline and with the problem of nationalities in the armed forces.⁵ Both these issues are more likely to attract the attention of a political officer than a line commander. They were also precisely the same issues Yazov wrote about while he was district commander.⁶ Observing his former commander's success (and perhaps aided by his encouragement), Moiseev probably concluded that such topics were more likely to capture the attention of the political leadership than purely military matters.

Moiseev's publically available writings are not imaginative and largely recycle the conventional wisdom. Any conclusions about him as a military thinker drawn solely from these writings would thus be on shaky ground. During his first year as head of the General Staff, Moiseev's writings dealt mostly with political issues such as arms control, *perestroika* in the military, and the unilateral cuts of the Soviet armed forces.⁷ He has yet to publish a major statement in any open military

⁴Filatov, "Siloi pravdy."

⁵See "Splochenie mnogonatsional'nykh kollektivov--otvetstvennaia zadacha kommandirov i politrabotnikov," *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No. 12, 1987, and "Ukreplenie distsipliny--zabota kazhdogo dnia," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 9, 1988, pp. 9-16.

⁶For example, see D. Yazov, "Ustavnoi poriadok vospityvaet," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 6, 1984, pp. 34-41.

⁷See, for example, "Na pozitsiiakh real'nogo sotsializma," *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 15, 1989, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, February 23, 1989, and "Realii nashego vremeni," *Sovetskii Patriot*, No. 1, 1990, p. 7. The only instance in which Moiseev touched on questions of military art and doctrine was his speech at a meeting with General Staff personnel during his election campaign: see "S pozitsii oboronitel'noi doktriny," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, February 10, 1989.

forum addressing such traditional concerns of the General Staff as military art and strategy.

Moiseev's Appointment in Light of the General Staff's Role

Moiseev's appointment seems particularly dramatic considering the historically unique role played by the General Staff. No comparable entity exists within any of the NATO armed forces. As Harriet and William Scott have pointed out, "the Soviet staff concept is so radically different from anything found in the Pentagon that its impact upon the Soviet armed forces is difficult for Americans to grasp."⁸ The closest outside equivalent to the Soviet General Staff was the pre-World War I German Army General Staff, which became the model for the Russian Imperial General Staff of the early 1900s.

The General Staff is responsible for basic strategic planning for the armed forces. It also determines the overall direction of each service's development. One Soviet reference source says that the General Staff's major task is "to coordinate the actions of the main staffs of the armed forces, the staff of the rear services, the staff of civil defense, the main and central administrations of the Ministry of Defense, the staffs of the military districts, the groups of forces abroad, the air defense districts, and the fleets. The General Staff thoroughly analyzes and evaluates current military-political conditions in the world, determines trends in the development of means for waging war and methods of their use, organizes the training of the armed forces, and carries out necessary measures for assuring their high degree of combat readiness to repulse any aggression."⁹

The General Staff acts as an executive body of the Supreme Military Command and is responsible for implementing the latter's decisions. It includes officers from all service branches and combines the functions of a "think tank," an intelligence network, and the military

⁸Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981, p. 103.

⁹*Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia*, Vol. 2, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1976, p. 513.

leadership's executive arm. It encompasses several directorates that are responsible for operational and force planning, organization and mobilization, intelligence, and foreign military assistance, to name just a few jurisdictions. A separate directorate is responsible for Warsaw Pact Forces.

The General Staff plays a critical role in debates on Soviet force structure and military doctrine. Its chief occupies the number-two position in the Ministry of Defense. He takes an active part in shaping the agenda of the Defense Council, the supreme administrative organ of the Soviet state in wartime. Especially since the 1970s, the enormous complexity of the General Staff's functions has made it imperative that any future chief spend some prior time working within the organization. The last two chiefs, Marshals Nikolai Ogarkov and Sergei Akhromeev, both served as first deputy chiefs for a number of years before their appointments. Ogarkov held the first deputy chief position, which also includes a role as secretary of the Defense Council, for six years (1968-1974). Akhromeev held that position for five years (1979-1984). Taking these two cases as precedents, the most logical candidate for Akhromeev's post would have appeared to be Colonel General Vladimir N. Lobov, who had occupied the first deputy position since February 1987.

In searching for possible reasons for Moiseev's appointment, one is immediately struck by Lobov's manifestly superior credentials for the job. In addition to having served on the General Staff, the 52-year-old Lobov is well known as a prolific and respected writer on various important subjects of military art. Lately he has become quite visible, giving a number of interviews to Soviet and foreign newspapers on a variety of topics, most notably arms control. In 1984, he replaced General Yazov as commander of the Central Asian Military District and earned high marks for his performance in that job. The only plausible reason for bypassing Lobov was that he was widely perceived as an Akhromeev protege. Lobov's appointment in February 1989 to the Warsaw Pact Forces chief of staff was, for all practical purposes, a demotion. At best, it was a lateral move from the General Staff.¹⁰

¹⁰There are three first deputy chiefs of the General Staff. One is responsible for the Main Operations Directorate, a second serves as

The appointment of Colonel General Moiseev thus represents a major departure for this respected and powerful organization. Even apart from Lobov, there were other high-ranking and well-respected members of the military elite who were more qualified than Moiseev for the job. The question of why an unknown was chosen over these clearly better-suited candidates remains unanswered. One explanation could be that the General Staff's authority is, to some extent, diminishing under the impact of Gorbachev's "new political thinking." General Moiseev is the youngest chief of staff to have held office since 1952, and the lowest ranking since 1946. His relative lack of experience and natural authority is particularly striking when one compares him to his predecessors, who include such legendary figures as M. V. Frunze, S. S. Kamenev, M. N. Tukhachevsky, B. M. Shaposhnikov, A. I. Egorov, K. A. Meretskov, G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, A. I. Antonov, S. M. Shtemenko, V. D. Sokolovsky, M. V. Zakharov, S. S. Biriuzov, and, more recently, Marshals of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov and N. V. Ogarkov.

Since the 1920s, and particularly since the appointment of B. M. Shaposhnikov as Chief of Staff of the Red Army in 1928, the military has consistently advocated linking the General Staff to the main policymaking centers that influence state policy. However, the General Staff did not become politically influential until after Stalin's death, when no political leader was any longer powerful enough to keep it in check. With Akhromeev's departure, the General Staff's political influence is likely to decline. Akhromeev, who was (and probably still is) the top Soviet authority on arms control issues, enjoyed an unusually close relationship with Gorbachev. Such is obviously not the case with the new chief of the General Staff.

The fact that Akhromeev's resignation was made public on the day of Gorbachev's announcement of the unilateral troop cut proposal seems more than coincidental.¹¹ The Soviet marshal had consistently opposed

chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Forces, and the third serves as full-time deputy chief. The last position, which Lobov occupied until his appointment to chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces staff, is considered top among the three. It is now occupied by Colonel General B. A. Omelichev.

¹¹The official date of Akhromeev's retirement and Moiseev's appointment was December 2, 1988. However, the Soviet Foreign Ministry

unilateral cuts in a number of speeches he made while Gorbachev's proposal was being privately aired within Soviet military and political circles.¹² Evidently, Akhromeev, who has all along been Gorbachev's closest arms control adviser, could not persuade his boss to change his mind on this subject. In this interpretation at least, he had no alternative as an honest soldier but to tender his resignation. Gorbachev appears to have understood this action, and as a reward for his honesty (the alternative would have been to remain in office and attempt to sabotage the implementation), has retained Akhromeev as his personal military adviser.

Moiseev's main task for the immediate future will be to supervise such nuts-and-bolts matters as the restructuring of the General Staff and the reduction and rejuvenation of its personnel. He will also be preoccupied with such traditionally professional functions as command and control modernization, operations, and combat training. As for the political role of the General Staff, several factors are likely to contribute to its continued decline. Among them is the fact that Akhromeev maintains a highly visible presence as Gorbachev's personal adviser. Also, both the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet, with its various new legislative commissions, are assuming progressively more authority in such traditionally military-dominated areas as arms control, the military budget, and the defense industry. One manifestation of this decline in the political influence of the General Staff is the fact that Moiseev has still not been offered membership on the Central Committee.

spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, waited until December 7, 1988, the day Gorbachev announced his unilateral troop cut proposal at the United Nations, to publicly report the change of command.

¹²In a recent speech in Stockholm, for example, Akhromeev stated that "unilateral actions to provide mutual security of defense are practically impossible." See Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeev, "Arms Control and Arms Reduction--The Agenda Ahead," Olof Palme Memorial Lecture, *SIPRI*, Stockholm, September 29, 1988, p. 14.

PETER LUSHEV, COMMANDER OF WARSAW PACT FORCES

On February 2, 1989, it was announced that Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor G. Kulikov had been replaced as commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces by Army General Peter G. Lushev, who previously had been first deputy minister of defense. Marshal Kulikov was considered a protege of the discredited former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, and thus his departure was expected by most observers. The only surprise was that it took so long in coming.

Lushev was born in 1923. Like his predecessor, he came from the great tradition of "tankmen" in the Soviet military leadership. After finishing a junior commanders' school in 1942, he fought in World War II, serving as a platoon and company commander. In 1954, after graduating from the Stalin Military Academy for Tanks and Mechanized Troops in Moscow, he commanded tank regiments in the Leningrad, Kiev, and Ural Military Districts. In 1966, after completing his studies at the General Staff Academy, he was offered the prestigious command of the showcase Guards Kantemirov Tank Division in the Moscow Military District. In 1967, he was promoted to general.

Like most of his predecessors in the Kantemirov Division, Lushev advanced rapidly and, in 1969, became first deputy commander of the First Guards Tank Army in the GSFG. Lushev served with the GSFG until 1975 and received impressive promotions, first to army commander in 1971 and then to deputy commander in chief in 1973. In 1972, he received his second star. It was quite obvious that Lushev was a protege of Kulikov, who at the time commanded the GSFG. On Kulikov's recommendation, Lushev was given command of the Volga Military District in 1975. A year later he became a colonel general.

Lushev's next command was the strategically important Central Asian Military District, where he remained until 1980, taking part in the preparation and execution of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1980, he was replaced by Yazov in Central Asia¹³ and was given the extremely sensitive post of commander of the Moscow Military District.

¹³Lushev's other connection with Yazov, which may explain why Yazov chose him for his current position, is his World War II record. Both men served at the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. Common combat

Lushev was promoted to the rank of army general in 1981. On his 60th birthday in 1983, in accordance with a tradition that has since been abandoned by Gorbachev, he was awarded the honorific Hero of the Soviet Union. According to official sources, this recognition was given for his "great contribution to increasing the combat readiness of the troops and for ... personal bravery in World War II."¹⁴ Lushev remained in charge of the politically important Moscow Military District throughout the post-Brezhnev leadership transition until 1985, when he was appointed by Gorbachev to the GSFG command.

After a short tenure at the GSFG, Lushev was transferred back to Moscow in July 1986 to replace the ailing Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Petrov as first deputy minister of defense. Lushev maintained a fairly high profile in this position and was even rumored to be a front-runner for replacing Marshal Sokolov as minister of defense. Clearly, his experience at the GSFG from 1969 through 1975 and from 1985 until June 1986 contributed to his appointment to the top posting in the Warsaw Pact Forces.¹⁵

Unlike some of Gorbachev's other appointees, General Lushev has been a prolific and well-known writer on military affairs.¹⁶ He has written on such topical themes as military strategy, combat training, command and control, the restructuring of military personnel, and the history of the Soviet armed forces. He has also been honored by *Krasnaia Zvezda*, the official Ministry of Defense organ, which asked him to write a review of one of the most important recent books on Soviet military art, *Frunze: Voennyi Teoretik* by M. A. Gareev.¹⁷

experience during the Great Patriotic War is extremely valued in the Soviet military, particularly among the few remaining active-duty veterans.

¹⁴See *Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza*, Vol. 1, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1987, p. 898.

¹⁵For more biographic data on Lushev, particularly his studies at the various military schools and academies, see Richard Woff, "Army General Petr Georgievich Lushev--Commander-in-Chief Warsaw Pact," *Soviet Intelligence Review*, March 1989, pp. 104-108.

¹⁶For a thorough analysis of some of Lushev's works, see George G. Weickhardt, "General Lushev: The Very Model of a Modern Soviet General," *Radio Liberty Report*, 423/87, October 27, 1987.

¹⁷See "Vydaishchiisia voennyi teoretik," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, February 19, 1985, p. 2.

In a major article published in 1987 in the *Military-Historical Journal*, Lushev presented a comprehensive articulation of Soviet military views on combat readiness. He emphasized the need for an appropriate balance between nuclear and conventional means of warfare; the importance of improving command and control structures; the significance of new weapons based on emerging technologies; the changing Soviet force structure; and the importance of the continued development of military science. He also stressed the role of second echelons and the importance of a timely introduction of reserves in future conflicts.¹⁸

The main reason for Lushev's advancement under Gorbachev, however, seems to have been his writing on topics close to the party leader's heart, such as the need for strengthening discipline, fighting corruption and *pokazukha* (empty showmanship), and attacking "formalism, placidity, and complacency" in military training.¹⁹

Lushev has also written on arms control topics, mostly rendering lip service to Moscow's recent arms-reduction initiatives and the proclaimed merits of a "defensive" military doctrine. Notwithstanding these pronouncements, however, the new Warsaw Pact Forces commander can hardly be considered a soft-liner. Although his last article on the subject of arms control insisted that the Soviet Union only seeks "equal security" with the West and has adopted an "extremely defensive military doctrine," it also called for a "steadfast increase in the socialist states' collective defensive capabilities."²⁰ According to Lushev, "as long as the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc exists," the defense of the Soviet Union will be linked organically not only to the defense of the

¹⁸See "Vysokaia boevaia gotovnost' Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil--vazhneishii printsip zashchity sotsialima," *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No. 7, 1987, pp. 3-14.

¹⁹See, for example, Lushev's articles: "S pozitsii vozroschikh trebovanii," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 10, 1983, pp. 30-37; "Kak trebuet ustav," *Tyl i snabzhenie*, No. 1, 1984, pp. 12-15; and "Vysokaia otvetstvennost' voennykh kadrov," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 5, 1987, pp. 9-17.

²⁰See "Defending the Gains of the Revolution," *International Affairs*, No. 9, 1987, p. 60.

other Warsaw Pact states, but also to "rendering internationalist assistance to the developing nations."²¹

During 1988, Lushev did not author any important articles in the military press. As a military leader, he has been extremely reserved in commenting on Gorbachev's announced unilateral cuts in Soviet forces. Yet his initial writings as commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces have been rather conservative and have reflected a fairly hard-nosed attitude toward the West. For example, in a recent article in *Krasnaia Zvezda*, he claimed that NATO maintained an overall superiority over the Warsaw Pact in Europe.²²

Lushev's appointment to command the Warsaw Pact Forces leads to some important conclusions. Although the years he spent as GSFG commander obviously played a major role, the main reason behind his appointment has most likely been Warsaw Pact politics. Bringing in Lushev to replace Kulikov was Gorbachev's way of appeasing some of the more conservative leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries. These leaders, who for many years have depended on the Soviet military presence for their own political survival, have been increasingly nervous about impending Soviet troop cuts (and, in some cases, the prospect of a wholesale withdrawal of Soviet forces).²³ Lushev was a close associate of Marshal Kulikov, who maintained particularly close relations with the older generation of East European leaders. The appointment of a Kulikov protege could be perceived by Moscow's allies as a safe choice.

²¹Ibid.

²²See P. Lushev, "Potentsial dlia napadeniia i peregovory v Vene," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, May 10, 1989.

²³See, for example, a particularly revealing interview in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* with the deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Hungarian Army, Colonel Geza Siposz, in which he stated that "the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary will not make Hungary more vulnerable. These steps have been considered a hundred times, a thousand times over. This is the right decision." *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, December 15, 1988, p. 3. One can imagine how such interviews might make some of Hungary's neighbors and colleagues in the Warsaw Pact uncomfortable.

That Gorbachev decided to appoint a veteran rather than a younger general like Moiseev to command the Warsaw Pact Forces also suggests that no significant upgrade in this organization's status is envisioned. The military significance of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces has been steadily declining in recent years, with their equipment becoming progressively inadequate for the demands of a modern, high-technology battlefield. With the introduction of the Soviet peacetime TVD headquarters system in 1984, the Warsaw Pact commander in chief has become more a political figurehead and less militarily important.

The announced cuts in the Warsaw Pact member states' defense budgets and the reduction of their armed forces portend an even further decline in the status of the Warsaw Pact commander in chief. Lushev is unlikely to survive in this position as long as his predecessor did. Indeed, it is even possible that the position itself will not survive for long.

ARMY GENERAL POPOV, DISTINGUISHED SOUTHERN COMMANDER

The most recent appointee to the Southern Forces Command, Army General Popov, was formerly commander of the Turkestan Military District. His appointment to this highest combined-arms command follows Gorbachev's trend toward promoting Afghan campaign veterans. Popov, who took command of the Turkestan Military District in October 1984, headed the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan, which was a part of his district. Interestingly, Popov also belongs to the powerful group of Far Easterners in the Soviet military leadership. From September 1979 through December 1981, he served as chief of staff of the Far Eastern Military District. Troops of the Southern Direction under Popov's command include the Turkestan, Transcaucasus, and Northcaucasus Military Districts, as well as the Caspian Flotilla.

General Popov has not written much. His name periodically appears on important anniversaries or military holidays, when he is interviewed or signs a predictable "date-related" article in the local press.²⁴ Nevertheless, from what little has been published under his name, one can venture several generalizations about Popov.

²⁴This relatively small number of publications in the open press, of course, does not rule out the possibility that Popov may have written for classified forums.

First, Popov's writings echo a familiar note of *perestroika* in military affairs. This attitude is likewise frequently exhibited by Yazov and Moiseev. It is distinguished by special attention to "softer" and largely nonoperational military issues such as cadre policy, nationalities relations, and the improvement of party-political work. These issues have traditionally been relegated to the more narrow domain of political officers.

While commanding the Turkestan Military District, Popov paid especially close attention in his writings to the nationalities problem. The Turkestan district embraces the single largest Muslim population in the Soviet Union and has lately experienced growing Islamic influence. The situation there has been further exacerbated by the continued Soviet indirect involvement in Afghanistan and by the worsening Soviet domestic economic situation. As a member of the Bureau of the Uzbekistan Central Committee, General Popov was undoubtedly aware of the complex political situation in that republic. In his writings in the local press, he stressed the need for training more officers of Central Asian origin: "We must consider the problem of training officer cadres from local nationalities as related to military-patriotic education. At present, their percentage in our officer corps is minute."²⁵ To increase Central Asian enrollment in military schools, Popov suggested that their technical and Russian-language training be substantially improved. He admitted that despite considerable efforts in this area, "the situation is unsatisfactory."²⁶

Popov's main claim to prominence in the military profession was his "creative adaptation" of the Afghan experience to troop training in his district. This adaptation included combat in mountainous terrain, night operations, the employment of small units operating independently from main forces, and mine warfare. Writing in 1988 on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet armed forces, Popov emphasized that in his military

²⁵N. I. Popov, "Military Patriotic Education: A Sacred Obligation," *Soviet Turkmenistony* (in Turkmen), June 13, 1987, translated by JPRS, UMA-88-001, p. 19.

²⁶*Ibid.*

district there was "a good tradition and an unswerving rule to train the troops in situations as close as possible to those of actual combat, and to carry out combat training tasks effectively under the difficult conditions of mountain and desert terrain."²⁷ The process of assimilating lessons from Afghanistan has never been easy for the Soviets.²⁸ The Turkestan Military District's leading role in this respect was undoubtedly appreciated in Moscow and may have contributed to Popov's promotion. Furthermore, the lessons learned from Afghanistan have direct application to any potential future conflict in this theater, including the Soviet Union itself.²⁹

To consider practical applications of the Afghanistan experience and to train his unit commanders more realistically, Popov established a kind of "field laboratory" in one motorized rifle regiment within the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan. This regiment, commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel V. Neverov, became a center for training unit commanders. According to Popov, it "fully utilized the opportunities that the specific conditions of ... service in Afghanistan can offer for training personnel."³⁰ One innovation introduced by Popov during his stint as district commander was a program of regular specialized seminars (*sbory*) for commanding officers conducted within certain select tactical units, such as Colonel Neverov's regiment. During these seminars, lessons from Afghanistan were systematically

²⁷"A Dependable Guard For Peace, Socialism," *Partiinaiia Zhizn'* (Tashkent), No. 2, 1988, translated in JPRS, UMA-88-016, p. 14.

²⁸For articles on how the Soviet military is trying to learn the lessons of the Afghan war, see, for example, Captain S. Popov, "S chem idti v boi?" *Aviatsiia i Kosmonavtika*, No. 7, 1988; "Shkola dlia komandirov," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, March 18, 1989; and Colonel G. Miranovich, "Ispol'zuia boevoi opyt," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, April 16, 1989.

²⁹See S. Ignat'ev, "Konflikty nizkoi intensivnosti i voprosy voennoi reformy v Sovetskom Soiuze," *Voennyi Vestnik APN*, No. 4 (February), 1990.

³⁰N. Popov, "Boevaia podgotovka: rezervy uskoreniia," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 22, 1987, p. 68. It is possible that Popov first met Neverov in the early 1980s in the Far East, since the latter commanded a motorized rifle regiment there from 1980 until 1982. Today, Colonel Neverov commands the prestigious 55th Guards motorized rifle Irkutsko-Pinsk Division in the Central Group of Forces. See *Krasnaia Zvezda*, September 2, 1989.

explored and new tactical solutions, as well as new weapons and equipment, were tested and validated in an operational setting.³¹

One of General Popov's most notable hallmarks, and perhaps a decisive one behind his promotion, was the extraordinary attention he devoted to the activities of political officers and party organizations. Unlike most other line commanders, who merely paid lip service to "party-political work" in their writings, Popov insisted that the party organization should play a more active role in the life of the units. In one article, he said that the party organization's indifference (*nevmeshatel'stvo*) to the commander's training priorities can contribute to a "deterioration of the unit's combat readiness."³² Here again, he saw the solution in "a broader utilization of the experience of the party committees of these units fulfilling their internationalist duty in Afghanistan."³³

General Popov's new position puts him in command of three military districts with a total of 30 divisions (including more than 300,000 active-duty personnel) and 700 tactical aircraft.³⁴ The TVD he heads also embraces the most potentially explosive areas, including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, and the Indian peninsula. As commander in chief of Soviet forces in the Southern Strategic Direction, he is responsible for assessing and preparing the TVD and for training troops for the many arenas in which they may have to operate. He is also responsible for operational contingency planning for any potential Soviet military involvement in this region. His experience in Afghanistan makes him a natural and logical choice for this assignment.

³¹Popov, "Boevaia podgotovka," p. 68.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴This number, according to the latest Soviet proposal, will be reduced by 60,000 by the year 1991.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of Gorbachev's tenure at the helm of the Defense Council since Yazov's appointment leads to the following general observations thus far:

- The political leadership--and Gorbachev in particular--is dissatisfied with the slow pace of *perestroika* in the military and feels that more radical reforms are necessary.
- The leadership believes that these reforms demand a younger, more flexible military leadership and one that will not be crippled by interservice rivalries or constrained by traditional institutional logic.
- Gorbachev is following a clear policy of appointing outsiders--officers who do not owe allegiance to more traditional senior active and retired military leadership--to key positions in which a considerable improvement in performance is expected.
- The civilian leadership is strengthening its control over the military and the broader national security process.
- Although the military has seemed superficially content thus far to fall in line with Gorbachev's "radicalism," the combination of his cavalier treatment of traditionally protected military bailiwicks and the country's continuously disappointing economic performance may well eventually move the High Command into the camp of the Soviet leader's domestic political opposition.

Appendix A
SOVIET REGIONAL COMMANDERS

Name	Headquarters Location	Appointed
M. P. Burlakov	Southern GSF (Papa, HU)	1988
E. A. Vorob'ev	Central GSF (Milovice, CZ)	1988
B. V. Gromov	Kiev MD (Kiev)	1989
N. V. Kalinin	Moscow MD (Moscow)	1989
A. V. Kovtunov	Forces in the Far East (Ulan Ude)	1989
V. P. Dubynin	Northern GoF (Legnica)	1989
A. I. Kostenko	Belorussian MD (Minsk)	1989
F. M. Kuzmin	Baltic MD (Riga)	1989
A. M. Makashov	Volga-Ural MD (Kuybyshev)	1989
I. S. Morozov	Odessa MD (Odessa)	1987
V. I. Novozhilov	Far Eastern MD (Khabarovsk)	1989
V. N. Osipov	Southwestern Direction (Kiev)	1989
N. I. Popov	Southern Direction (Baku)	1989
V. M. Semenov	Transbaikhal MD (Chita)	1988
S. I. Postnikov	Western Direction (Legnica, PL)	1988
B. E. P'Yankov	Siberian MD (Novosibirsk)	1987
V. A. Patrikeev	Transcaucasus MD (Tbilisi)	1989
V. V. Skokov	Carpathian MD (L'vov)	1986
B. V. Snetkov	Western GSF (Wunsdorf, GDR)	1987
I. V. Fuzhenko	Turkestan MD (Tashkent)	1989
L. S. Shustko	North Caucasus MD (Rostov-na-Donu)	1987
V. C. Tsarkov	Moscow Air Defense District	1987
V. P. Ivanov	Baltic Fleet (Baltiisk)	1986
M. N. Khronopulo	Black Sea Fleet (Sevastopol)	1985
V. Ya. Lyashchenko	Caspian Sea Flotilla (Baku)	1989
F. N. Gromov	Northern Fleet (Severomorsk)	1989
G. A. Khvatov	Pacific Fleet (Vladivostok)	1987
V. G. Selivanov	Leningrad Naval Base	1990

Appendix B

HIGHEST MILITARY DECORATIONS AWARDED (1965-1989)

Rank	Brezhnev	Andropov	Chernenko	Gorbachev
Marshal of the Soviet Union	8	3	-	1
Admiral of Fleet of the SU	1	-	-	-
Chief Marshal of Aviation	2	-	1	-
Chief Marshal of Artillery	-	1	-	-
Chief Marshal of Armored Troops	1	-	-	-
Admiral of Fleet	5	1	-	3
Marshal of Aviation	12	1	-	3
Marshal of Artillery	5	-	-	1
Marshal of Armored Troops	2	-	-	-
Marshal of Engineering Troops	4	-	-	-
Marshal of Signal Troops	2	-	-	-
Army General	47	6	1	14

Appendix C

MILITARY DEPUTIES OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

1. Colonel Aksent'ev, Anatolii Vasil'evich, chief of the winter sports section at the Soviet Armed Forces Central Sports Club, from the sport organizations of the USSR.
2. Colonel Alksnis, Viktor Imantovich, senior engineer-inspector of the Baltic Military District Air Force, Jugla okrug 294, Latvian SSR.
3. Colonel Aushev, Ruslan Sultanovich, commander of the MR Region, FE MD Maritime Kray, Ussuriiskii okrug 102.
4. MSU Akhromeev, Sergei Fedorovich, adviser to the President of the USSR, from Belskii okrug 697, Moldavian SSR.
5. Lieutenant Belyaev, Sergei Vladimirovich, assistant chief for Komsomol work, border guard detachment, FE MD, from Komsomol.
6. Major Bochkov, Oleg Aleksandrovich, chief of staff of a unit, Kaluga oblast, Maloyaroslavetskii okrug 186.
7. Lieutenant General Britvin, Nikolai Vasil'evich, chief of the Borderguard Troops PA, Moscow okrug 375.
8. Army General Varennikov, Valentin Ivanovich, commander in chief of the Ground Forces, Maloderbetovskii okrug 552, Kalmyk ASSR.
9. Colonel General Vorob'ev, Eduard Arkad'evich, commander of the CGoF, from Uzhgorodskii okrug 451, Transcarpathian oblast.
10. Captain Gaida, Mikhail Mikhailovich, aviation technician, from Uman okrug 539, Cherkassy oblast (Ukraine).
11. Captain Gams, Eduard Sergeevich, researcher at the military scientific-research institute, from Balakovo okrug 286, RSFSR.
12. Army General Govorov, Vladimir Leonidovich, chief of Civil Defense, from Groznenskii okrug 672, Chechen-Ingush SSR.
13. Golovnev, Vassilii Efimovch, military unit technician, Mogilev oblast, Krichev okrug No. 96.
14. Major Gonchar, Aleksandr Nikolaevich, party committee secretary, MR regiment, Leningrad Military District, Pechenga city, Murmansk oblast from CPSU.

15. Major General Gorbatko, Viktor Vasil'evich, chief of the faculty in the Air Force Engineering Academy im N. Ye Zhukovskii, chairman of the All-Union Philatelist Society (former cosmonaut), from the All Union Society of Philatelists.
16. Colonel General Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich, commander of the Kiev Military District, from Prilukskii okrug No. 542, Chernigov oblast.
17. Captain Demin, Aleksandr Borisovich, deputy company commander for political affairs, Siberian Military District, Novosibirsk oblast, Barabinsk okrug 234.
18. Major Erokhin, Vassilii Aleksandrovich, deputy subunit commander, Aleksandriiskii okrug 477, Kiev oblast.
19. Marshal of Aviation Efimov, Aleksandr Nikolaevich, commander in chief of the Air Force, from the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans.
20. Major Zolotukhin, Vladimir Petrovich, permanent correspondent of the Turkestan Military District *Frunzenets*, Tashkentsko-Kuibyshevskii okrug 599.
21. Admiral Ivanov, Vitalii Pavlovich, commander of the Baltic Fleet, from Kaliningrad okrug 178.
22. Colonel General Kalinin, Nikolai Vasil'evich, commander of the Moscow Military District, from CPSU.
23. Major General of Aviation Klimuk, Petr Il'ich, chief of the Yu. Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center Political Department, from DOSAAF.
24. Marshal of Aviation Kozhedub, Ivan Nikitovich, military inspector and adviser to the Ministry of Defense Group of General Inspectors, from DOSAAF.
25. Colonel General Kolinichenko, Aleksei Nikolaevich, chief of the Soviet Western Group of Forces Political Administration, from Zheleznodorozhnyi okrug 154, Ulan Ude.
26. Captain Kolodeznikov, Aleksandr Semenovich, assistant chief of department at the Yakutsk Military Commissariat, from Komsomol.
27. Colonel Kol'tsov, Yurii Arsenovich, deputy unit commander, Odessa Military District, Kerchenskii okrug 483, Crimean oblast.
28. Colonel General Korbutov, Ivan Ivanovich, from Bobruiskii okrug No. 95.
29. Colonel General Kostenko, Anatolii Ivanovich, commander of the Belorussian Military District, Borisov okrug No. 70.

30. Colonel General Kotlovtshev, Nikolai Nikiforovich, chairman of DOSAAF, from DOSAAF.
31. Army General Kochetov, Konstantin Alekseevich, first deputy defense minister, Odintsovskii okrug 37, Moscow oblast.
32. Colonel General Kuz'min, Fedor Mikhailovich, commander of the Baltic Military District, Leninskii okrug 706, Riga.
33. Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov, Viktor Sergeevich, general inspector, Ministry of Defense, from All-Union Labor and War Veterans Organization.
34. Army General Lizichev, Aleksei Dmitrievich, former chief of the MPA, from CPSU.
35. Army General Lobov, Vladimir Nikolaevich, FDC General Staff, Aiaguzinskii okrug 135, Kazakh SSR.
36. Major Lopatin, Vladimir Nikolaevich, unit propagandist, Volgograd city okrug 145.
37. Army General Lushev, Petr Georgievich, commander in chief of the WP, from DOSAAF.
38. Colonel General Makashov, Albert Mikhailovich, commander of the Volga-Ural Military District, from Irbitskii okrug 297, Sverdlovsk oblast.
39. Army General Maksimov, Yurii Pavlovich, commander in chief of the SRF, from Krasnoiarskii okrug 16.
40. Colonel Martirosian, Vilen Arutiunovich, unit commander, from Rovenskii okrug 509, Rovno oblast (Ukraine).
41. Colonel General Mikhailov, Vladlen Mikhailovich, DC General Staff (chief of the GRU), from Buinakskii okrug 528, Dagestan ASSR.
42. Army General Moiseev, Mikhail Alekseevich, chief of the General Staff, from CPSU.
43. Colonel General Moiseev, Nikolai Andreevich, chief of the Ground Forces Political Directorate, Tsentral'nui okrug 316, Tula oblast.
44. Colonel General Morozov, Ivan Sergeevich, commander of the Odessa Military District, from Tiraspol'skii okrug 704.
45. Lieutenant General Ovchinnikov, Aleksandr Ivanovich, Chief of the Troops of the Southern Direction Political Directorate, from Chirchikskii okrug 120, Uzbek SSR.

46. Colonel General Omelichev, Bronislav Ivanovich, FDC of the General Staff, from Iolotanskii okrug 428, Turkmen SSR.
47. Army General Osipov, Vladimir Nikolaevich, commander in chief of the Southwestern Direction Troops, from Bendery okrug 698 (Moldavia).
48. Colonel Ochirov, Valerii Nikolaevich, AF regiment commander, from Universitetskii okrug, Kalmyk SSR.
49. Lieutenant General Panov, Ivan Mitrofanovich, editor of *Krasnaia Zvezda*, from the USSR Journalists Union.
50. Colonel Petrushenko, Nikolai Semenovich, senior propaganda and agitation instructor in a unit political department, from Leninogorskii okrug 622, East Kazakhstan.
51. Colonel General Piankov, Boris Evgen'evich, commander of the Siberian MD, from Dzerzhinskii okrug 230 in Novosibirsk.
52. Colonel Pisarenko, Viktor Andreevich, FDC of the Siberian Military District AF Political Department, Kamenskii okrug 69, Altai krai.
53. Lieutenant Colonel Podziruk, Viktor Semenovich, senior instructor, navigator researcher in a military unit, Ivanovskii okrug 9.
54. Army General Popov, Nikolai Ivanovich, commander in chief of the Southern Direction Forces, Kivrakskii okrug 620, Nakhichevan ASSR.
55. Army General Postnikov, Stanislav Ivanovich, commander in chief of the Western Direction Troops. Brestskii okrug 547.
56. Lieutenant Colonel Pylin, Boris Fedorovich, senior instructor at the Kachinskii Higher Military Pilots School, Sovetskii okrug 139 (Volgograd oblast).
57. Colonel General Rodionov, Igor Nikolaevich, commander of the General Staff Military Academy, Borzhomskii okrug 660 (Georgia).
58. Colonel General Semenov, Vladimir Magomedovich, commander of Transbaikal Military District, Kiakhtinskii okrug 523, Buriat ASSR.
59. Marshal of Aviation Silant'ev, Aleksandr Petrovich, military inspector and Adviser, Ministry of Defense Inspectors General Group, All-Union Organization of Labor and War Veterans.
60. Colonel General Skokov, Viktor Vasil'evich, Commander of Carpathian Military District, Kovel'skii okrug 412, Volyn oblast.
61. Lieutenant Colonel Skrobuk, Ivan Ivanovich, subunit commander, Grodno oblast, Slonimskii okrug 562.

62. Colonel Smirnov, Vladimir Sergeevich, deputy unit commander, from Akhtubinsk okrug 124, Astrakhan oblast.
63. Sokolova, Yuliia Yur'evna, senior instructor at the MPA, from the women's councils united, Soviet Women Committee.
64. Fleet Admiral Sorokin, Aleksei Ivanovich, general inspector, Ministry of Defense, from the All-Union Veterans Organization.
65. Army General Sorokin, Mikhail Ivanovich, deputy minister of defense, chief inspector, from Altai okrug 3.
66. Major General Surkov, Mikhail Semenovich, chief of the Army Political Department, from Leninakan-Shirak okrug 396, Armenia.
67. Army General Sukhorukov, Dmitrii Semenovich, general inspector, Ministry of Defense, Lubenskii okrug 506, Poltava oblast.
68. Lieutenant Colonel Sychev, Iurii Petrovich, instructor at the Scientific Communism Department of the Leningrad Higher Military-Political Officers School of the PVO Troops, from Primorskii okrug 57, Leningrad.
69. Army General Tretiak, Ivan Moiseevich, commander in chief of the PVO, All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans.
70. Senior Lieutenant Tutov, Nikolai Dmitrievich, secretary of the Komsomol Committee of a unit in the AF, Orenburgskii okrug 244.
71. Senior Lieutenant Uvarov Aleksandr Ivanovich, secretary of a military unit Komsomol Committee, Kalinin oblast, from Komsomol.
72. Major Urvant, Vadim Nikolaevich, secretary of a unit party bureau, Shepetovskii okrug 534, Khmel'nitskii oblast.
73. Lieutenant Colonel Falk, Petr Petrovich, senior navigation officer with a military unit AF, Buzulukskii okrug 246, Orenburg oblast.
74. Colonel General Fuzhenko, Ivan Vasil'evich, commander of the Turkestan Military District, Termezskii okrug 592, Sukha-Darya oblast, Uzbek SSR.
75. Major Kharchenko, Konstantin Aleksandrovich, deputy subunit commander for political affairs, Moscow Military District (Kalinin city), Kalinin okrug 180.
76. Major General Kharchuk, Boris Ignat'evich, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR DOSAAF CC, from DOSAAF.
77. Colonel Tsalko, Aleksandr Valer'ianovich, military unit commander, Moscow Military District, Kalininskii okrug 12.

78. Colonel General Chekov, Nikolai Vasil'evich, deputy defense minister for construction and billeting troops, from DOSAAF.
79. Fleet Admiral Chernavin, Vladimir Nikolaevich, commander in chief of the Navy, Lenkoranskii okrug 678, Azerbaijan.
80. Army General Shabanov, Vitaly Mikhailovich, deputy defense minister (armaments), Khmel'nitskii okrug 531, Ukraine.
81. Senior Sergeant Shatrovenko, Yurii Nikolaevich, cadet of Voroshilovgrad Higher Military Aviation School of Navigators, from Komsomol.
82. Lieutenant General Shkanakin, Vladimir Gennad'evich, commander of the Turkestan Military District AF, (Tashkent city), Tashkentskii-Leninskii okrug 597.
83. Senior Lieutenant Shul'gin, Ivan Ivanovich, assistant chief of troops for Komsomol work, Pacific Fleet naval infantry unit, Maritime krai, from Komsomol.
84. Colonel General Shustko, Lev Sergeevich, commander of the North Caucasus MD, from Zatrechnyi okrug 628, Severo-Osetinskaia SSR.
85. Captain Yasterbtsov, Sergei Viacheslavovich, deputy battalion commander, Odessa Military District, Izmailskii okrug 501, Odessa oblast.